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Abstract
The feeling of voluntary control and awareness of movement is fundamental to our notions of selfhood and
responsibility for actions, yet can be lost in neuropsychiatric syndromes (e.g. delusions of control, non-epileptic
seizures) and culturally influenced dissociative states (e.g. attributions of spirit possession). The brain processes
involved remain poorly understood. We used suggestion and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to
investigate loss of control and awareness of right hand movements in 15 highly hypnotically suggestible subjects.
Loss of perceived control of movements was associated with reduced connectivity between supplementary motor
area (SMA) and motor regions. Reduced awareness of involuntary movements was associated with less activation in
parietal cortices (BA 7, BA 40) and insula. Collectively these results suggest that the sense of voluntary control of
movement may critically depend on the functional coupling of SMA with motor systems, and provide a potential
neural basis for the narrowing of awareness reported in pathological and culturally influenced dissociative
phenomena.
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Introduction
The normal sense of being able to initiate and control
movements is altered or lost in a variety of neuropsychiatric
disorders [1]. For example, medial frontal and corpus callosum
lesions are associated with the condition of ‘anarchic’ hand,
whereby the limb produces stereotypic movements
independent of the patient’s intentions [1]. Schizophrenia, focal
epilepsy and right parietal lobe lesions are associated with the
related but distinct condition of ‘alien control’, in which the
patient reports that their actions are not generated by
themselves but by a force or entity outside the self [1,2].
‘Anarchic hand’ and ‘delusions of alien control’ involve loss of
perceived control of movement, but the patient is typically both
aware of the limb movement and that it is their limb that is
moving without their voluntary control. As such, the experience
of agency or perceived control of limb movement is lost, but
ownership of the limb and awareness of limb movement are
retained.
Involuntary movements (i.e. movements not attributed to the
exercise of the agent’s will) can, however, also be
accompanied by apparent narrowing or loss of awareness, as
exemplified by psychogenic non-epileptic seizures defined as
“episodes of altered movement, sensation, or experiences
resembling epileptic seizures… not associated with ictal
epileptiform discharges but which instead have a psychological
origin” [3]. Awareness is partially or fully lost in up to 50% of
patients [3]. As dissociative disorders these involve a
“disruption of the usually integrated functions of consciousness,
memory, identity or perception of the environment” [4]
understood as “an involuntary response to emotional, physical,
or social distress” [3]. Involuntary movements associated with
narrowing or loss of awareness also occur in culturally-
influenced dissociative phenomena linked to spirit possession,
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mediumship, and shamanism, which have been widely
reported across different cultures and periods of history [5-9].
Nevertheless, whilst involuntary movements with or without
loss of awareness are found in a variety of neuropsychiatric
syndromes and culturally influenced alterations in experience
and behaviour, the cognitive and neural processes
underpinning these phenomena remain largely unknown [1,3].
One experimental approach to investigating voluntary control
of movement and its loss in the laboratory involves employing
hypnotic suggestion in healthy, non-clinical participants [10].
This approach was first used in combination with neuroimaging
to investigate the neural correlates of experiences of alien
control in a PET study that involved suggested misattributions
of self-generated movements [11]. Six highly hypnotically
suggestible male participants (scoring 9 to 12 on The Harvard
Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility: HGSHS) were
hypnotised throughout a PET scanning session whilst
experiencing repetitive vertical movements of the left arm
produced (i) voluntarily (Active Movement condition), or (ii) by a
suggestion that consisted of telling the participant that a pulley
would be used to move the arm up and down when in fact the
pulley was not activated (Deluded Passive Movement
condition). The Deluded Passive movements were associated
with significantly greater activations in bilateral cerebellum and
parietal cortex relative to Active Movement.
In that study it was proposed that the administration of a
suggestion for external control prevented or disrupted the
feedforward inhibition of sensory processing of self-generated
actions that would otherwise occur according to the standard
‘forward model’ of motor control [12-14]. Failure to attenuate
sensory processing for what in reality is self-generated
movement was proposed to underlie the observed increases in
cerebellar-parietal activity in the Deluded Passive condition.
However, increased cerebellar-parietal activity during ‘Deluded
Passive’ movements could also represent the neural correlates
of the heightened sensory salience of unexpected movements,
rather than the experience of involuntariness per se. Indeed,
these activations were also seen during a Passive Movement
condition, when movement was produced passively via the
operation of a pulley system [11]. Hence, an alternative
hypothesis is that the experience or feeling of the
involuntariness of suggested ‘alien control’ results from
changes occurring at the level of executive motor planning and
intention.
In healthy individuals, the supplementary motor area (SMA)
is active during motor planning and the intention to move
[15-18]. The SMA is active both before the onset and during
movements subjectively reported to be self-initiated or
controlled [19]. SMA activity precedes conscious awareness of
the decision to initiate a given action [20], while stimulation of
the SMA via electrodes is associated with an urge to move
[21]. Normal motor output is also accompanied by connectivity
between the SMA and systems involved in the implementation
of the actions (M1, basal ganglia, and cerebellum) [19,22].
Consequently, reduced activation of SMA or reduced functional
connectivity with other regions involved in action
implementation (such as premotor cortex, M1, S1, and
cerebellum) are likely candidates for mediating the loss of
perceived voluntary control following attributions of self-
generated actions to a source other than the self – as occurs in
association with pathological and culturally influenced
dissociative phenomena, delusions of alien control, or
suggestions of involuntary movement.
Also, as far as we are aware no previous studies have
combined suggestion and neuroimaging to explicitly examine
the neural correlates of suggested involuntary movement
accompanied by loss of awareness (to model symptoms and
experiences reported by patients experiencing psychogenic
non-epileptic seizures [3] or culturally influenced dissociative
states [8,9]).
We predicted that reduction in subjective awareness of
involuntary movements would be associated with reduced
activation of superior parietal cortex (BA 7), a brain region
involved in the integration of somatosensory and visual
information during visuomotor coordination of hand
movements, in addition to a more general awareness of the
bodily self [23,24]. We also expected that reduced bodily
awareness would be associated with reduced activation of the
insula, a key brain region supporting somatosensory
awareness [25,26].
To investigate the functional anatomy of loss of limb control
and awareness of movements in highly hypnotically
suggestible subjects, we employed a controlled design using
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Suggestions
were used to create selective changes in behaviour that were
experienced as involuntary and which reproduced symptoms or
experiential changes analogous to those observed in
psychopathology or culturally influenced dissociative states
[6,10]. For the purposes of these experiments participants were
required to move a joystick with their right hand under a variety
of suggested conditions following a standardised hypnotic
induction procedure. These included:
a. normal voluntary movement;
b. involuntary movement with preserved awareness (such as
occurs in passivity phenomena in schizophrenia and in
association with psychogenic non-epileptic seizures and other
dissociative involuntary movements); and
c. involuntary movement with reduced awareness (modelling
psychogenic non-epileptic seizures and other dissociative
involuntary movements accompanied by loss of awareness).
To summarise, the main hypotheses were that:
1. involuntary movement relative to voluntary movement
would be associated with decreased activity of the SMA and
reduced functional connectivity of the SMA with motor regions
involved in movement implementation [27];
2. reduced awareness relative to preserved awareness of
involuntary movements would be associated with reduced
activation of superior parietal cortex (BA 7) and insula;
3. involuntary relative to voluntary movement would be
associated with significantly reduced perceived control but not
awareness of hand movements; and
4. the introduction of a suggestion of reduced awareness
would be additionally associated with significant reductions in
subjective measures of awareness.
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Also, whilst we did not employ targeted suggestions to
directly modify the sense of hand ownership, we acquired self-
ratings of ownership to test whether suggested loss of control
also affects the sense of hand ownership [28].
Methods
Experimental Conditions and Contrasts
The study involved seven experimental conditions. The first
four conditions focused on voluntariness and awareness and
are presented in the current paper.
The 3 key contrasts (see Table 1) are:
I. Main effect of hypnosis: nhyp-vol vs. hyp-vol
II. Main effect of voluntariness: hyp-involA vs. hyp-vol
III. Awareness contrast: hyp-involA vs hyp-involNA
Three subsequent conditions varied attributions about
personal and impersonal causes of involuntary movement.
These findings are presented in a separate paper.
Experimental conditions were presented in a randomized
order across subjects, with the exception of a) the nhyp-vol
condition, which always occurred prior to induction of hypnosis;
and b) the hyp-vol condition, which was the first condition
presented following hypnotic induction. In order to control for
effects of hypnosis on baseline measures of control,
ownership, and awareness of movements, and potential effects
of hypnosis per se on brain function, the hyp-vol condition was
used in subsequent contrasts to determine the effects of
suggested involuntariness on brain activity. In addition, the
hyp-vol condition was a suitable contrast condition because the
degree of movement did not significantly differ between
hypnosis conditions (see below).
Participants
The research was approved by the Ethics Committee of the
Institute of Psychiatry, Kings College London (040/02).
Participants provided their written informed consent to
participate in this study. Thirty-three highly hypnotically
suggestible individuals (14 Male/ 19 Female) were recruited as
possible participants from databases of volunteers previously
Table 1. The four experimental conditions, the abbreviated
name and the focus of the suggestion for each condition.
Condition Name Abbreviation  Suggestion
1. Non-Hypnosis (normal
alert state) nhyp-vol Before hypnosis - normal movement
2. Hypnosis-Involuntary hyp-involA During hypnosis – “hand moves all byitself”. Normal awareness
3. Hypnosis-Involuntary-
No-Awareness hyp-involNA
During hypnosis – “hand moves all by
itself”. Reduced awareness of
movement, body and surroundings
4. Hypnosis-Voluntary hyp-vol During hypnosis - normal movement
The three contrasts of interest are the ‘hypnosis contrast’ ((Nr. 1 vs. 4)), the
‘voluntariness contrast’ ((Nr. 2 vs. 4)) and the ‘awareness contrast’ ((Nr. 2 vs. 3)).
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0078324.t001
tested on The Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility
(Form A) (HGSHS:A) [29] at either University College London
(UCL, N = 16) or the Institute of Psychiatry (IoP, N = 17). Their
HGSHS scores ranged from 8 to 12 with a mean of 10.06 (SD
1.06). All 33 were screened using the same protocol as that
used in the neuroimaging study (described below) except that
participants were required to make hand movements with their
right hand similar to those involved in moving a joystick from
side to side whereas an actual joystick, held by the participant
in their right hand, was present in the scanner.
This screening was carried out in a small, normally lit
experimental room at either UCL (N= 31) or at the IoP (N = 2)
with participants sitting in a comfortable chair. Fifteen of these
33 potential participants went on to the scanning study.
Reasons for exclusion of the remaining 18 were: did not
experience reliable change in sense of ‘agency’ in response to
suggestion (N = 7); not suitable for scanning [metal in body,
grommets, too big for scanner, recent subdural haemorrhage]
(4); not available (3); no/small overt motor responses (2); left
handed (2).
Of the 15 participants scanned 5 were male and 10 female,
their mean HGSHS score was 9.8 (SD 1.08: range 8-12), their
mean age was 33.67 (SD 11.91: Range 20-61 years). The
majority were undergraduate or postgraduate students (8),
while the remainder were members of a variety of professions.
Eleven participants (7 female) were included in the final data
analysis (three were excluded due to excessive drop-out of
frontal MRI signal and one due to scanner data acquisition
technical error). Their mean HGSHS score was 9.91 (SD=1.04,
Range 9-12) and their mean age was 29.27 years (SD= 8.40,
Range 20-47).
Hypnotic induction and reversal
The hypnosis induction procedure was carried out with the
participant lying in the scanner with their eyes open and fixating
on a target consisting of a white crosshair projected on a black
background. An experimenter administered suggestions
(reported verbatim below, where ‘…’ indicates a pause).
Continued fixation on the target was accompanied by
suggestions of involuntary eye closure (“your eyes will begin to
close all by themselves”) and the participant was asked to say
“yes” when this had happened. The eye closure suggestions
were combined with suggestions of muscle relaxation until the
participant said “yes” after which the relaxation suggestions
continued alone. The muscle relaxation sequence commenced
with the face, progressing systematically throughout the body
to the legs and feet. Finally there was a counting procedure
(1-20) preceded by the suggestion that this would be
accompanied by (i) a further deepening of the experience of
relaxation, (ii) a reduced awareness of background sounds,
and (iii) the ability to carry out all the things they would be
required to do without it disturbing the state they had achieved
at the end of the count. Participants’ eyes remained closed
throughout their experience of hypnosis.
Reversal of hypnosis was achieved by a reversed counting
procedure (20,) preceded by the suggestion that this would be
accompanied at some point by the participant’s eyes opening
and that they would be “wide awake … fully alert” at the end of
Suggested Loss of Movement control and Awareness
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the count. The participant was asked to say ‘yes’ when their
eyes opened. The scripts used for the hypnotic induction and
reversal stages are included verbatim in Oakley et al. [30]
except that the ‘Special Place’ procedure was omitted in the
present study.
Voluntary movement instructions and ‘Agency’
suggestions
In the briefing before the experimental procedure
commenced, and in a practice run in the scanner, participants
were reminded that “though your arm may feel relaxed you will
retain your grip and your hand will remain in contact with the
joystick at all times”, and “in all movement tests your hand will
not move during the instruction to ‘Rest’ – but will make the
required movement when the instruction to ‘Move’ is given –
though your experience of that movement will vary.” They were
reminded to continue to hold the joystick in their right hand
prior to each scan.
i) For the ‘voluntary’ movement condition before [nhyp-vol]
and during hypnosis [hyp-vol] the instructions to the participant
were: “In a moment you will hear recorded instructions at
regular intervals. The instruction will say, “REST”, which simply
means not attempting to use or prepare to move your right
hand; or “MOVE” which means move the joystick to the right
and then to the left once with your right hand each time. The
instructions will come at regular intervals. Don’t guess what is
coming, just listen and follow the instructions to the best of your
ability”. Both nhyp-vol and hyp-vol were carried out with the
participant’s eyes closed.
ii) For the hypnotic involuntary movement condition [hyp-
involA] the instructions combined with a suggestion were “Just
remain as relaxed and hypnotised as you are now… As before
you will hear recorded instructions at regular intervals. When
you hear the word “REST” do nothing- just relax. When you
hear the word “MOVE” your right hand will move all by itself …
and will move the joystick to the right and then to the left once
each time. Your right hand will make this movement all by
itself; you will feel no control over when your right hand is going
to move but you will be clearly aware of the movement of your
hand and of the joystick when it occurs. You will remain calm
and relaxed during these movements of your hand. The
instructions will come at regular intervals. Don’t guess what is
coming, but at all stages listen to the recorded instructions.” At
the end of this condition the suggestion was removed as
follows “Your right hand no longer moves of its own accord – it
is back under your control – your right hand is back to normal
again. Say “yes” when this has happened.”
iii) For the involuntary movement with loss of awareness
condition [hyp-involNA] the instructions combined with
suggestions were: “Just remain as relaxed and hypnotised as
you are now… As you do so you begin to lose awareness of
your own body and your surroundings – it is as though your
body ceases to exist for you and you are unaware of the
positions of your arms and your legs – unaware of your hands
and your fingers – unaware of your own actions and any
movements you might make. You remain aware of being
yourself, but have no experience of your body or the world
around you. You will however be aware of the spoken
instructions. You will remain calm and relaxed throughout. As
before the recorded instructions will occur at regular intervals.
When the word “REST” is spoken your body will not respond –
you will simply remain relaxed. When the word “MOVE” is
spoken your right hand will move all by itself … and will move
the joystick to the right and then to the left once each time but
you will not be aware that it has done so. Your right hand will
make this movement all by itself but you will not know that this
has happened. You will have no control over when your right
hand is going to move and no awareness of the movement of
your hand and of the joystick when it occurs. The instructions
will come at regular intervals. At all stages listen to the
recorded instructions.”
At the end of this condition the suggestions were removed as
follows: “Just focus your attention back to your body and as
you do so you begin to regain your awareness of your own
body and your surroundings – you become aware of the
positions of your arms and your legs - aware of your hands and
your fingers – aware of your own actions and any movements
you might make. Your mind remains clear and in touch with
your own internal thoughts and ideas and is reconnected with
your body and your surroundings – and you are once more
aware of your body.” The participant was asked to say “yes”
when normal awareness of body and surroundings had
returned.
There were four additional conditions (making a total of eight
conditions), which are not reported here. These included a
repeat of the voluntary movement condition at the end of the
scanning session and three additional agentive control
conditions.
Motor Tasks and Induction of Alterations in Agency
Presentation of motor epochs and concurrent acquisition of
fMRI data followed a block periodic design involving repeated
alternation between non-movement (‘Rest’) and activation
(‘Move’) epochs (30 second intervals) with 10 ‘Move’ or ‘Rest’
instructions per epoch administered at 3 second intervals. Each
block comprised 10 epochs (five ‘Move’, five ‘Rest’) so that
each block was of 5 minutes duration. The motor task was
therefore ‘invariantly instructed’ rather than ‘free choice’, given
that the movements occurred in response to a standardised
instruction (‘Move’) [31].
During scanning, joystick displacement was carefully
monitored. A condition was repeated if no joystick movement
was observed, resulting in the repetition of three conditions out
of 88 (across all participants and conditions). The position of
the joystick was recorded throughout each condition and the
standard deviation of the position was used to index joystick
displacement amplitude for the Move trials [32].
At the end of each experimental block, participants verbally
rated their subjective experience of the movement of their right
hand with respect to: (i) awareness (from ‘0’ to ‘10’, where ‘0’
means ‘you had no awareness of your hand and its movement’
and ‘10’ means ‘you had full normal awareness of the
movements of your hand’); control (‘0’ means ‘you had no part
in initiating or controlling the movement of your hand’ and ‘10’
means ‘you and you alone initiated and controlled the
movement in response to the instructions’); and (iii) ownership
Suggested Loss of Movement control and Awareness
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(‘0’ means ‘you do not experience the moving hand as being
your hand – it does not feel like your hand’ – and ‘10’ means
‘you have the normal sense of the moving hand being your own
hand’). Two additional ratings were taken of (i) the strength of
emotion reaction participants felt during each experimental
block (‘0’ means ‘you felt no emotional reaction associated with
the instructions or suggestions given about the hand
movement’ while ‘10’ means that ‘the instructions or
suggestions given about the hand movement created a very
strong emotional reaction’) and (ii) subjective ‘depth of
hypnosis,’ also rated from 0-10 [30].
Image Acquisition Parameters
Imaging data were acquired at 3 Tesla (3T) using a GE
Signa HDx MRI scanner at the Centre for Neuroimaging
Sciences, Kings College London UK. Functional MRI
examinations were conducted using gradient echo, echoplanar
imaging (EPI) with the following scanner parameters: repetition
time = 2000 msec; echo time = 30 msec; RF flip angle = 80
degrees; Slice orientation = near-axial, aligned to the anterior-
posterior commissure; number of slices = 40, interleaved
acquisition; slice thickness = 3 mm; slice gap = 0.3 mm;
acquisition matrix size = 64 x 64. For each of the nine
experimental blocks (conditions), a total of 150 functional
images were acquired continuously.
Neuroimaging data analysis
Functional images were processed and analysed in SPM5
(Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK; http://
www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). All images were initially realigned to
first image and then their mean image. The mean image was
spatially normalized to the SPM5 EPI template and spatially
smoothed (8 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel), and high-pass
filtered (128 s). The general linear model (GLM) was then used
to generate parameter estimates of activity at each voxel, for
each of the experimental conditions using single-subject
models. These included a condition coding the onsets and
durations of the movement blocks (convolved with the
canonical haemodynamic response function) and the six
motion parameters derived from the realignment procedure. A
flexible-factorial ANOVA group analysis (unequal variances)
was conducted on contrast images for movement versus rest
from the single-subject analyses, with condition as a fixed
effect and subject as a random effect. Group brain activation
maps were calculated for ‘movement’ versus ‘rest’ to confirm
significant engagement of the motor network for each condition
and contrasts between conditions were generated to test the
effects of hypnosis and targeted suggestions. Statistical
significance was defined at the cluster level (p<0.05 after
multiple comparisons correction, with a voxelwise threshold of
p<0.001).
Functional connectivity analysis
To establish the nature of interactions between different
brain areas that mediate joystick movements under the
different experimental conditions, we also performed a
psychophysiological interaction analysis [33]. The first step was
the selection of the seed region for SMA [18]. While some
individual subjects activated the SMA, the movement versus
rest contrast in the non-hypnosis condition did not produce a
significant activation at the group level. The coordinates for the
SMA seed (-2, -12, 53) were therefore calculated from the
mean values from two studies with similar motor tasks to our
study, which were -2, -14, 52 [34] and -2, -10, 54 [22]. The
seed for the PPI analysis for each participant was defined as
the eigenvalue for a 6mm radius sphere around the peak
activation nearest the SMA seed coordinates. In order to
ensure the data were from the same functional locale across all
individuals, we excluded participants for whom the Euclidian
distance between the peak activation voxel per condition
closest to the seed coordinates for SMA exceeded 6 mm.
Therefore, the PPI analysis for SMA included seven
participants (four excluded).
For the PPI analyses the single-subject models included
regressors for the seed region, the task design (‘movement’
versus ‘rest’), their interaction as described in Friston et al.,
(1997) [35] and the six movement parameters. The PPI
contrast image was entered into a flexible factorial ANOVA
model including all eight experimental conditions. We then
tested changes in connectivity in the contrast of hyp-vol and
hyp-involA across the whole brain. Given that our sample size
was smaller for the PPI analyses because we excluded
participants whose seed voxels lay outside our defined
functional locale (see above), we used a voxel-wise threshold
of p < 0.01, with statistical inference based on a cluster
statistics threshold of p<0.05 corrected for multiple
comparisons.
Results
The effects of hypnosis and specific suggestions on
joystick displacement
The mean joystick movement values (standard deviation in
parentheses) for the four experimental conditions were nhyp-
vol 21.8 (SD = 6.4); hyp-vol 18.8 (SD = 6.9); hyp-involA 16.6
(SD = 9.4); and hyp-volNA 12.3 (SD = 8.9). There was a main
effect of hypnosis: movement amplitude in the nhyp-vol (non-
hypnosis) condition (mean=21.8; SD=6.4) was significantly
greater than the movement amplitude in the hyp-vol (hypnosis)
condition (mean=18.8; SD=6.9); t(9)=2.55; p=0.031.
Furthermore, participants moved the joystick to the same
extent regardless of whether the suggestion was to move the
right hand voluntarily (hyp-vol) or that the hand “moved all by
itself” (hyp-involA) mean=16.6; SD=9.4); t(9)=1.18 p=0.268).
Similarly the difference in joystick displacement did not reach
statistical significance for the hyp-involA and the hyp-involNA
(mean=12.3; SD=8.9); t(9)=1.966; p=0.081, although it could
be argued that there was a trend towards less movement in the
hyp-involNA. The joystick displacement data for one participant
were unavailable for technical reasons.
In order to test if subtle differences in movement affected the
brain imaging results presented below, the participants with the
largest differences between the two conditions were identified
and the imaging results tested without them. In addition,
correlations between the imaging findings and joystick
movement were performed (see below).
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Self-ratings
Depth of hypnosis: For the three hypnosis conditions hyp-vol,
hyp-involA and hyp-involNA, the mean self-rated depths of
hypnosis were 7.8 (SD=1.5), 7.7 (1.5) and 7.6 (1.2)
respectively, and were as expected, significantly higher than
the nhyp-vol condition (mean=1.7; SD=2.1); F(3,30)=60.6;
p<0.0001. For the same three hypnosis conditions, direct
contrasts between them showed that there were no significant
differences in depth of hypnosis (all p>0.640).
Self-ratings associated with the awareness, control and
ownership of the right-hand and its movements following the
suggestions are given in Table 2. For each of these ratings
there was a main effect of hypnosis (nhyp-vol vs hyp-vol);
when in the non-hypnosis condition as opposed to the hypnosis
condition, participants reported significantly higher ratings for
awareness t(10)= 3.75; p=0.004; control t(10)= 2.76; p=0.020
and ownership t(10)= 2.73; p=0.021.
The suggestion that a participant’s hand would move “all by
itself” (hyp-involA) as compared to it moving voluntarily (hyp-
vol) was associated with significantly reduced ratings of control
t(10)= 5.17; p<0.001 and ownership t(10)= 4.04; p=0.002.
There was no difference in awareness ratings for the hyp-
involA condition t(10)= 0.971; p=0.355.
When it was suggested, “you will not be aware of your hand
or its movements…” (hyp-involNA vs hyp-involA), participants
reported significant reductions in feelings of awareness (t(10)=
3.65; p=0.004), control (t(10)= 3.19; p=0.010) and ownership
(t(10)= 3.28; p<0.001). In other words, the reduced awareness
suggestion produced a profound effect on people’s subjective
experience of their movements, body, and surroundings.
Planned t-tests (two tailed) were performed for the three
contrasts of interest for emotion ratings, and revealed that
there were no significant differences between conditions:
I. Main effect of hypnosis: (nhyp-vol vs hyp-vol); t(10)=1.057 ;
p=0.321.
II. Main effect of voluntariness: (hyp-involA vs hyp-vol);
t(10)=1.550 ; p=0.152.
III. Awareness contrast: (hyp-involA vs hyp-involNA);
t(10)=0.602 ; p=0.561.
fMRI Data: General Linear Model Analyses
(i): Task-related engagement of the motor system in the
non-hypnosis condition.  First we identified activations
produced by movement of the joystick in the non-hypnosis
Table 2. Subjective ratings (0 to 10 scale; 0=none; 10=full)
for awareness, control, ownership and emotion for the 4
experimental conditions (group means; standard deviations
are given in brackets).
 hyp-vol hyp-involA hyp-involNA nhyp-vol
Awareness 8.1 (1.2) 7.6 (1.8) 5.1 (2.4) 9.5 (0.9)
Control 9.2 (0.8) 5.7 (2.1) 4.0 (2.7) 9.6 (0.7)
Ownership 9.0 (1.2) 6.0 (2.3) 3.7 (2.9) 9.8 (0.4)
Emotion 1.8 (2.4) 2.5 (2.2) 2.7 (2.0) 2.6 (2.7)
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0078324.t002
condition. These analyses showed that classic motor regions
and networks (including left M1, left SMA and right cerebellum)
were significantly activated by right hand movements (Figure
1). Significant activations were also observed in left thalamus
and left postcentral gyrus.
(ii): Main effect of hypnosis during joystick
movement.  Next we tested for any changes in brain activity
during joystick movement in the hypnotic state (hyp-vol; i.e.
without suggestions of involuntary movement) as compared
with the non-hypnosis condition (nhyp-vol). This analysis
revealed no significant differences in brain activity.
(iii): Voluntary versus involuntary movement during
hypnosis, with preserved awareness.  Following the
Figure 1.  Performance of the motor task (joystick
movement) in the non-hypnosis condition (nhyp-vol
condition) engaged established components of the ‘motor
network’, including a) right cerebellum b) left thalamus c)
left postcentral gyrus (M1) and d) left SMA.  Crosshairs
show peak activation at each cluster.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0078324.g001
Figure 2.  Suggested loss of awareness (hyp-involA
versus hyp-involNA , 2>3)) was associated with reduced
activation in a) left SPL (BA 7) and IPL (BA 40) and b) left
supramarginal, left middle occipital and left superior
temporal gyri (p<0.001).  
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0078324.g002
Suggested Loss of Movement control and Awareness
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 October 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 10 | e78324
induction of hypnosis, there were no significant differences in
brain activity during voluntary (hyp-vol) compared to involuntary
(hyp-invol) movement. The similarity between these two
conditions was supported by a correlational analysis [36] which
showed that most voxels within the motor cortex and cerebellar
activation clusters had reliability of Intraclass Coefficient > 0.5
(data not shown).
(iv): Changes in brain activity associated with reduced
awareness of movement.  The contrast of brain activity during
involuntary movement with normal awareness and involuntary
movement with reduced awareness of body, movement and
surroundings (hyp-involA vs. hyp-invol-NA) showed that
reduced awareness was associated with significantly
decreased activity in left inferior and superior parietal lobules
as well as left superior temporal and visual areas (Figure 2 and
Table 3). The results remained significant after removal of the
two participants who moved the joystick the least in the
reduced awareness condition. Also, the results did not
correlate with movement; specifically, Spearman’s correlation
confirmed that there were no significant relations between the
joystick movement parameters and insula signal change
(Spearman’s rho = 0.30; p=0.41) or somatosensory cortex
change (Spearman’s rho = 0.09; p=0.80). This suggests that
subtle and non-significant reductions in joystick movements
(and any changes in proprioceptive feedback associated with
such reductions) could not explain the differences in brain
activity between involuntary movement with and without
awareness that we report.
fMRI data: functional connectivity
(Psychophysiological Interaction (PPI) analysis)
We predicted that suggested involuntary movement would be
associated with reduced functional connectivity between key
regions involved in motor planning (SMA) and implementation
(M1). Psychophysiological interaction [33] connectivity analysis
showed reduced connectivity between SMA and other brain
regions following suggested involuntary movement relative to
voluntary movement (hyp-vol > hyp-involA) as detailed in Table
4. The SMA seed showed reduced connectivity with right M1
and right calcarine visual cortex (see Figure 3.b).
Discussion
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was
employed to investigate both the functional anatomy of loss of
control and awareness of right hand movements in healthy,
highly hypnotically suggestible subjects. The main findings
were that:
i. subjective ratings of control and awareness varied
in accordance with the specific suggestions for loss of
control and awareness when compared to voluntary
movement following the induction of hypnosis;
ii. loss of voluntary control of hand movement was
associated with reduced connectivity between SMA
and components of the motor network involved in
movement implementation; and
iii. reductions in movement-related activation were
observed in the left superior parietal cortex and insula
during involuntary movement with reduced
awareness.
Effects of hypnosis induction on subjective experience
and movement related brain activity
Subjective experience as assessed by self-rating measures
indicated that the hypnotic induction procedure produced a
significant increase of depth of hypnosis for all conditions
compared to the non-hypnosis condition with no significant
Table 3. Clusters of activations in a) during movement in
the non-hypnosis condition compared to rest (nhyp-vol vs.
Rest); b) Non-hypnosis condition vs. voluntary movement
during hypnosis (nhyp-vol vs. hyp-vol) and c) involuntary
movement with awareness vs. involuntary movement
without awareness (hyp-involA vs hyp-involNA). Regions in
bold type are the statistical peak of each cluster while
regions shown in normal (non-bold) typeface refer to other
significant voxels within the same cluster.
Anatomical
Region   Hemisphere   
MNI
coordinates
Cluster
size
Z
value   
Cluster-
levelp
corrected BA
a) nhyp-vol >
Rest       
Cerebellum Right 20, -44, -30 1402 7.71 0.000  
Thalamus Left -14, -18, 0 648 4.19 0.000 35
Amygdala Left -20, -4, -10    34
Putamen Left -24, -10, 6    -
Postcentral Left -38, -28, 56 669 3.74 0.000 3
Precentral Left -30, -22, 54    4
SMA Left -2, -6, 72 218 3.57 0.007 6
Mid Cingulum Left -8, -6, 52    -
SMA Right 2, -14, 60    6
b) nhyp-vol vs
hyp-vol       
No significant
differences       
c) hyp-involA >
hyp-involNA       
Superior
Parietal Left -28, -58, 62 813 5.60 0.000 7
Inferior Parietal Left -34, -40, 46    40
Supramarginal
gyrus Left -48, -36, 30 487 4.65 0.001 48
Superior
Temporal Left -50, -42, 20    41
Mid Occipital Left -44, -66, 6 333 4.06 0.007 37
Middle Temporal Left -48, -66, 12    37
Superior
Temporal Left -50, -8, 0 243 3.72 0.026 48
Putamen Left -34, 0, 4    48
Insula Left -36, -2, -4    48
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0078324.t003
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differences in self-rated depth of hypnosis between hypnosis
conditions. Compared to voluntary movement in the non-
hypnosis condition (nhyp-vol), voluntary movement following
the induction of hypnosis (hyp-vol) was associated with small
but significant reductions in the perceived control, ownership
and awareness of movements. However, there were no
significant differences in brain activity during voluntary
compared to involuntary movement. Compared to rest,
voluntary movement in the non-hypnosis condition, and
following the induction of hypnosis, was associated with
increased activity in established brain regions involved in
voluntary action, including bilateral SMA, contralateral premotor
Table 4. Psychophysiological interaction (PPI) connectivity
analysis showing reduced connectivity between the SMA
and other brain regions following suggested involuntary
movement relative to voluntary movement (hyp-vol > hyp-
involA): (SMA seed = -2, -12, 53) (p<0.01).
Anatomical
Region Hemisphere   
MNI
coordinates   
Cluster
size
Z
value   
Cluster-
levelp
corrected BA
Postcentral Right 44, -26, 38 1728 3.81 0.000 3
Precentral Right 60, -6, 46  3.50  4
Supramarginal Right 52, -34, 38  3.48  2
Inferior Parietal Right 56, -38, 52  3.36  40
Superior Frontal  32, -8, 68  2.90  6
SMA Midline 0, -8 62 1721 3.66 0.000 6
Paracentral
Lobule Left -18, -12, 64    6
Mid-Frontal Left -24, 4, 60    6
Superior Frontal Left -24, 2, 68    6
Calcarine Right 10, -84, 8 1176 3.46 0.003 17
Inferior
Occipital Right 34, -84, -4    19
Mid-Occipital Right 34, -72, 10    37
Mid-Temporal Right 38, -64, 10    37
Regions in bold type are the statistical peak of each cluster while regions shown in
normal (non-bold) typeface refer to other significant voxels within the same cluster.
cortex, M1, S1 and thalamus, and ipsilateral cerebellum (Table
3a). Hence, the experimental paradigm elicited activity in brain
systems known to be associated with voluntary movement.
Loss of voluntary control of movements
Compared to voluntary movements, targeted suggestions of
involuntary hand movement (hyp-involA) were associated with
significant reductions in the self-rated control and ownership
but not awareness of hand movements as predicted. This
reduction of the sense of hand ownership following suggestions
of loss of control of hand movement supports the view that
control and ownership of movements are closely linked
phenomenologically and may be mediated by shared brain
mechanisms [28]. Furthermore, relative to voluntary movement
(hyp-vol) suggestions for loss of control and ownership of hand
movement were accompanied by reduced connectivity
between SMA and motor implementation regions in the
absence of any differences in magnitude of BOLD signal.
These results should be regarded as preliminary because of
the small sample size employed for PPI (n=7). Nevertheless,
the findings suggest that temporal correlation between the
activity within brain regions involved in the initiation and
execution of movements, rather than the magnitude of their
activity, is responsible for the experience that movements are
voluntary as opposed to involuntary. Future studies employing
EEG could test whether perceived loss of voluntary control (i.e.
involuntary movement) is associated with desynchronisation of
midline frontal and motor regions.
We also found that involuntary relative to voluntary
movements were associated with reduced connectivity
between SMA with visual cortical regions. The reason for these
reductions in connectivity is unknown. However, while
participants’ eyes were closed throughout the experiment,
activation of visual cortical regions might be expected if visual
imagery strategies were employed by participants while
performing the task [37,38]. The relationship between visual
imagery, perceived involuntariness of movements, and brain
connectivity requires further investigation.
Furthermore, we note that all changes in connectivity were
ipsilateral with no evidence that contralateral connectivity was
affected. This was in contrast to the GLM analysis, which
Figure 3.  Functional connectivity analysis showed that following the induction of hypnosis, relative to the experience of
voluntary movement, the suggested experience of involuntary movement(hyp-involA < hyp-vol) was associated with
reduced connectivity between the SMA (seed = -2, -12, 53) and the right postcentral (M1) and calcarine visual
cortex.  Crosshairs show peak activations for each cluster; all thresholded at p<0.01.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0078324.g003
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showed the classic pattern of contralateral M1 and ipsilateral
cerebellar activity during movement compared to rest (Figure
1). Loss of the sense of voluntary control may be related to
changes in the contributions of each hemisphere to motor
control. This could be tested in future studies – for example, by
parametrically varying the level of perceived voluntary control
of movement and correlating this with PPI to determine
differential effects on hemispheric connectivity.
Loss of awareness of movement
Suggested loss of awareness relative to preserved
awareness of involuntary movements was associated with
significantly reduced self-ratings of awareness, control, and
ownership of movements. At a neural level, loss of awareness
was associated with significant reductions in activity in left
parietal superior (BA 7) and inferior (BA 40) parietal cortices
and supramarginal gyrus; temporal regions (superior, middle,
and BA 37); and putamen and insula. These findings support
our prior hypothesis that narrowing of awareness of body,
environment and hand movements would be associated with
reduced activity in parietal regions (BA 7) involved in
representing the sense of body in space and in relation to limb
movements, and reductions in insula activity associated with
reduced somatosensory awareness. Reduced activity in visual
processing regions (BA 37) may be associated with a reduction
of vivid visual imagery consequent on suggestions of loss of
awareness.
While suggested involuntary relative to voluntary movement
was associated with reductions in functional connectivity of
SMA with motor implementation regions, this contrast was not
associated with increased activity in cerebellar-parietal regions
as described in an earlier study using suggestion and PET to
model ‘deluded passive’ movement [11]. If cerebellar-parietal
activations are associated with the heightened awareness of
unpredicted movements rather than the sense of their
involuntariness, the absence of significant differences in the
self-reported awareness of actions between the voluntary (hyp-
vol) and involuntary (hyp-involA) conditions may account for
the lack of modulation of cerebellar-parietal activity. This in turn
may be related to the inclusion of a suggestion that “you will
remain calm and relaxed during these movements of your
hand” in each of the motor conditions. It is also notable that
suggestions of reduced awareness of involuntary movements
(hyp-involNA) relative to involuntary movements with preserved
awareness (hyp-involA) was associated not only with reduced
self-ratings of awareness but also with reduced parietal cortical
activity. This provides additional support for the idea that
modulation of parietal activity relates to the awareness of limb
movements rather than the sense of their voluntariness. It may
therefore be that the salience of unexpected limb movements
associated with involuntary action may, where present,
contribute to but not be necessary for the overall sense of the
involuntariness of a movement.
Modelling neuropsychiatric and culturally influenced
alterations in experience
This study demonstrates the potential of employing
suggestion in association with fMRI to create experimental
models or analogues of psychopathological and culturally
influenced alterations in the control, ownership, and awareness
of actions in the laboratory [39]. Each experimental hypnosis
condition was preceded by a suggestion targeted to produce a
specific alteration in the experience of movement which was
then reversed at the end of each 5 minute scan. Changes in
brain activation and / or connectivity associated with each
condition are therefore likely to be involved in the
accompanying alterations in the experience of movement and
by analogy to the modelled clinical and cultural phenomena.
However, it has also been postulated that pathological and
culturally influenced dissociative symptoms in general, and
dissociative seizures in particular, can be caused by suggestive
and auto-suggestive processes [3,5,6,39,40]. The present
experiment provides not only a working model of the putative
brain changes that underpin relevant changes in experience
but also the psychological process (suggestion) that helped
produce them. Despite differences in form (e.g. external verbal
commands in hypnosis versus non-verbal external or internal
cues in dissociation), suggestive processes and their
attributions appear to modulate relevant brain systems (e.g.
motor regions in involuntary movements) via changes in
otherwise intact prefrontal-executive control systems (e.g. the
SMA complex) [41]. Similarly, passivity phenomena in
schizophrenia (e.g. delusions of control) may be underpinned
by functional changes in the SMA complex as modelled in the
present experiment. However, this disconnectivity may result
from dysregulation of executive and other brain systems
associated with abnormalities of brain anatomy and
neuromodulatory systems [42]. In this case, misattributions
about the causes of actions may be secondary to disturbances
of the sense of control, ownership, and awareness, rather than
precede and contribute to them as occurs in the case of
suggestions. The phenomenon of anarchic hand results from
lesions that may also include medial prefrontal regions
encompassing the SMA complex [1]. The present findings
illustrate how altered function of the SMA complex [19] may
result in a perceived loss of control and ownership of hand
movements, indicating how loss or alteration of SMA function
due to a lesion may disrupt the normal sense of control and
ownership of the contralateral limb [1]. In summary, the current
experimental model is relevant to understanding different forms
of psychopathological and culturally influenced alterations of
control, ownership, and awareness of limb movement when
viewed in relation to the distinctive features of each
phenomenon.
The present experiment employed targeted suggestions and
fMRI to investigate reduction of awareness of limb movement
as reported in some psychopathological and culturally
sanctioned dissociative phenomena. Reduced awareness of
involuntary movements was associated with reductions in
parietal cortex (BA 7, BA 40) and insula amongst other brain
regions. This raises the question of whether comparable
changes in brain activity accompany loss of awareness in
anosognosia, a common and debilitating condition where
neurological deficits are associated with differential and
variable degrees of deficit unawareness including denial of
disability in the case of hemiplegia, hemiparesis, and other
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disorders [43]. Targeted suggestions and fMRI could be
employed to test this hypothesis.
The study has a number of limitations. First, while we
conducted our experimental protocol on 33 highly hypnotically
suggestible volunteers outside the scanner, only 15 were
suitable for and / or consented to participate in the fMRI
experiment. Of these 15 individuals, 11 were included in the
final analysis of motor activations (see Methods and Results).
Further, only 7 were included in the connectivity analyses for
the SMA seed. While these exclusions may potentially increase
the risk of Type II errors by reducing the power to detect
differences, we believe that it is more important to minimise the
risk of Type 1 errors by robust checks on data quality. We
would also add that because only approximately 10% of the
population is highly hypnotically suggestible, we had to screen
over 300 individuals to recruit the subset of individuals who
eventually participated in fMRI scanning [30] – illustrating one
of the practical challenges in modelling neuropsychiatric
symptoms in highly hypnotically suggestible subjects. Future
studies with larger sample sizes in our laboratory will be
facilitated by the recruitment database (see Methods) and
hypotheses established from the current study.
We also found that the contrast of voluntary movement in the
non-hypnosis condition (nhyp-vol) compared to voluntary
movement following induction of hypnosis (hyp-vol) did not
reveal significant differences in brain activity. This differs from
the growing evidence that hypnosis is associated with
modulation of default mode network (DMN) and attentional
network activity [44]. Lack of modulation of DMN by the
induction of hypnosis in the present experiment may be
because simple guided motor output tends to produce limited
task related deactivations, reducing the scope for modulatory
effects of hypnosis on DMN activity to be detectable between
conditions. However, we employed the voluntary movement
following hypnosis condition (hyp-vol) in relevant contrasts to
determine the effects of suggested involuntariness, so
controlling for any potential effects of hypnosis per se on subtle
differences in brain activity or connectivity.
Experimental conditions were presented in a randomized
order across participants, with the exception of a) the nhyp-vol
condition, which always occurred prior to induction of hypnosis;
and b) the hyp-vol condition, which was the first condition
presented following hypnotic induction. The order of involuntary
movement with (hyp-volA) and without awareness (hyp-volNA)
was randomized and therefore differences between these
conditions are unlikely to represent order effects. Following
hypnosis the voluntary movement condition preceded the
involuntary movement condition, although the timing of the
latter condition was randomized. We note that a contrast of all
of the other randomized conditions against hyp-vol did not
show the same pattern of differences as hyp-vol vs hyp-involA
– therefore, it seems unlikely that the specific results we
observed for voluntariness can be explained as the result of a
simple order effect.
Prior studies have indicated a role for parietal regions in the
sense of voluntary action [45]. However, we chose to focus on
the SMA to avoid problems of multiple comparisons in view of
our relatively small sample size and the well-established body
of evidence supporting a role for SMA in the experience of
voluntary movement [46]. Nevertheless, future studies with
larger samples should investigate the relative contributions of
the SMA complex and parietal cortices to the experience of
voluntary and involuntary movement. Similarly, a future study
with a larger sample should also investigate the relative
contributions of feedforward and feedback signals to the
experience and neural underpinnings of voluntary and
involuntary movement – for example, by the inclusion of a
passive movement condition as a contrast for suggested
involuntary movement [11].
Conclusion
The present study used targeted suggestions to investigate
the functional anatomy of the voluntariness and awareness of
movement, in healthy highly hypnotically suggestible
participants. Compared to voluntary movements, involuntary
movements were associated with reduced connectivity of SMA
with other motor implementation regions. Modulation of SMA
connectivity may therefore underpin loss of control and
ownership of movements in pathological and culturally
influenced dissociative phenomena, as well as delusions of
alien control. Reduced awareness of involuntary movements
was associated with reduced activity in parietal (BA 7, BA 40)
and insula cortices, amongst other brain regions, suggesting a
potential neural mechanism for the narrowing of awareness
reported in pathological and culturally influenced dissociative
phenomena. Thus, association cortices with somatotopic
mapping (parietal and insular cortices) mediate awareness of
limb movements, whereas the sense of voluntariness appears
instead to depend on connectivity within motor system areas
linking intention to action. Future studies could employ
methods (such as EEG or MEG) to test the hypothesis arising
from this study that the perceived control and ownership of
actions is mediated by the correlated activity of SMA with motor
implementation systems.
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